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NATURAL LAW AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Mark Strasser*
INTRODUCTION
Hawaii is on the verge of recognizing same-sex marriages.' None-
theless, some Natural Law Theorists argue that same-sex marriages
cannot be true marriages and thus cannot be recognized by any state.
These arguments are unpersuasive for two reasons. First, they under-
mine each other in that they as readily establish that the state should
recognize same-sex marriages as that it should not. Second, they at
least implicitly involve a misunderstanding of the relation between
Natural Law as a moral system and American domestic relations juris-
prudence. Even if Natural Law had a determinative content which
specified that same-sex marriages were morally impermissible, this
would not establish what states must or even should do, because the
(alleged) dictates of Natural Law are ignored in other areas of domes-
tic relations jurisprudence regarding who may marry whom and re-
garding the conditions under which marriages are recognized as
legally valid. Indeed, not only does current domestic relations law re-
ject the Natural Law rationales, but the individual and state interests
implicated in marriage which have already been recognized in the law
strongly support the recognition of same-sex unions.
Part I of this article discusses Natural Law both as a legal theory
and as a moral theory.2 In neither form will the dictates of the system
be completely determinate. Thus, some Natural Law moral theories
will yield dictates which directly contradict those of other Natural Law
moral theories, and some Natural Law legal theories will yield dictates
which directly contradict those of other Natural Law legal theories.
Ironically, some of the rationales purportedly establishing that Natu-
ral Law as a moral theory prohibits same-sex marriage as readily es-
* Associate Professor, Capital University Law School; B.A., Harvard College; Ph.D, Univer-
sity of Chicago; J.D., Stanford Law School.
1. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1965 (1997) ("We can confidently predict that Hawaii will
recognize same-sex marriages."); Victoria Slind-Flor, Same-Sex Case Poses Many Questions,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1996, at A8 (discussing that given the composition of the Hawaii Supreme
Court, it is likely that the lower court decision will be affirmed).
2. See infra Part I.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tablish that such marriages are morally permissible as that they are
morally impermissible. Part II discusses the important state and indi-
vidual interests that are implicated in marriage, concluding that both
state and individual interests would be promoted rather than under-
mined by the legal recognition of same-sex unions.3 Part III concludes
that same-sex marriages should be recognized for both moral and
legal reasons and, further, that the kinds of specious arguments of-
fered to prohibit the legal recognition of such unions should at the
very least serve as a cautionary tale for those who trumpet Natural
Law as a kind of bulwark against the unfair treatment of minorities.4
I. NATURAL LAW AND DETERMINATIVE CONTENT
Part of the difficulty in deciding whether Natural Law supports, per-
mits, or prohibits same-sex marriage is that Natural Law might refer
to any number of legal and moral positions.5 Even focusing solely on
Natural Law as a moral theory, one would still find that the term
might refer to a number of different, potentially conflicting theories.
Ironically, an examination of some of the particular Natural Law theo-
ries which ostensibly establish the impermissibility of same-sex mar-
riage reveals that the claimed clarity and consistency of these theories
does not exist. Further, the dictates of the systems as easily support as
undermine the permissibility if not obligatoriness of the state's recog-
nizing same-sex marriages.
A. The Legal Theory Versus the Moral Theory
Natural Law might refer to either a legal or a moral theory.6 Natu-
ral Law as a legal theory (Natural LawL) posits that there is a neces-
sary connection between law and morality.7 Such a position might
helpfully be contrasted with legal positivism, which denies that neces-
sary connection.8 However, Natural LawL Theorists are not wedded
to any particular moral theory. Thus, one such theorist might be a
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra notes 6-19 and accompanying text.
6. Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 2393, 2394
(1992) ("[N]atural law refers both to a moral theory and a legal theory, neither of which bears
any obvious logical relationship to the other.").
7. See id. at 2395 (stating Natural Law as a legal theory "takes its shape from its explicit
opposition to legal positivism: the legal positivist claims that no necessary connection exists be-
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utilitarian, another might be a deontologist, and yet another might
subscribe to her particular society's conventional morality.9
Natural LaWL Theorists do not only disagree about which moral sys-
tem is correct; they also disagree about the nature of the required con-
nection between law and morality. For example, while claiming that
law must have its own inner morality, 10 some Natural LaWL Theorists
merely mean that the law must meet certain procedural require-
ments." Others claim that the content of the law must itself be in
accord with certain moral requirements and that laws which fail to
meet that standard are not in fact laws. 12
Natural Law as a moral theory (Natural LawM) makes claims about
the nature of morality, e.g., that moral principles are objectively valid
and are discoverable by reason. 13 Yet, a variety of moral theorists
might claim that the moral system to which they subscribe meets those
conditions. 14 For example, a utilitarian might claim that the "'greatest
happiness principle,"' which holds that "actions are right in propor-
tion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce
the reverse of happiness," 15 is objectively true and discoverable by
reason.16 Other theorists might make similar claims about the discov-
erability and objective validity of their own moral systems. 17
An individual might be a Natural Law Moral and Legal Theorist
(Natural Law TheoristML). However, such a theorist might have any
number of positions. For example, her position may be that her moral
9. See id. at 2400 ("To be a natural law legal theorist seems only to require that one determine
legal validity by reference, not only to the positivist test of pedigree, but also by reference to
morality-including conventional morality if that turns out to be the true theory of morality.").
10. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 644-45 (1958) (discussing the inner morality of law).
11. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (2d ed. 1969) (discussing eight ways to fail
to make a law); see also Daniel E. Wueste, Fuller's Processual Philosophy of Law, 71 CORNELL
L. REV. 1205, 1212-13 (1986) (book review) (discussing Fuller's view on the inner morality of
law).
12. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
13. See Soper, supra note 6, at 2394 ("[O]ne of the characteristics that makes a moral theory a
natural law theory: namely, the insistence that moral principles are objectively valid and discov-
erable by reason."); see also Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Moral Point of View, in NATURAL LAW,
LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY 195, 196 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) (describing the common
element of Natural Law theories as "simply the assertion of some moral principle (or set of
principles) as certain and dispositive of the matter at hand").
14. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
15. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 8 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ'g 1979) (1861).
16. See id. at 34-40 (offering a kind of "proof" for the principle of utility).
17. See, e.g., ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 47 (1978) ("[E]very agent, on pain of
self-contradiction, must accept a certain supreme principle of morality [which Gewirth will of-
fer]. In virtue of this, the principle will emerge as categorically obligatory and as having a strictly
rational justification.").
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theory is true and objectively discoverable by reason and that laws
which require or even permit immoral practices are not in fact laws,18
or that morality is objective but also that law must merely have certain
procedural protections in order to qualify as law. 19
B. The Natural Law Position on Same-Sex Marriage
Various theorists claim that Natural Law precludes same-sex mar-
riages.20 Yet, the validity of such a claim cannot be established until
that claim has been analyzed more fully. For example, it would be
important to know whether this was a claim about Natural Law as a
legal theory or as a moral theory. Since Natural LawL addresses the
necessary connection between law and morality but does not specify
which moral theory must be true,2' the claim that Natural Law prohib-
its same-sex marriages is presumably, at the very least, a claim that
Natural LawM condemns such marriages. There might be an addi-
tional implicit assertion at work here, namely, that because Natural
LawM (allegedly) condemns such marriages,2 2 and because Natural
LawL posits a necessary connection between law and morality, the law
therefore must not recognize such marriages. However, that addi-
tional assertion would require further justification even were the first
claim accurate2 3 and thus can only be examined after the first claim
has been discussed.
It would not be surprising if a Natural LawM Theorist claimed that
same-sex marriages were morally impermissible. Natural Law has
been cited to establish the moral permissibility and impermissibility of
18. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
596-97 (1958) (discussing Austin's reading of Blackstone to the effect that a law which conflicts
with Divine Law is not a law).
19. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (describing Lon Fuller's procedural Natural
Law position).
20. See Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications
of Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MD. L. REV. 450, 482-83 (1994) (suggesting
that a court could conclude that same-sex marriages are contrary to Natural Law); Scott Ruskay-
Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1446 (1997) ("[T]here are ample sources for the argument that gay and
lesbian relationships contravene natural law.").
21. See Soper, supra note 6, at 2395 ("Legal theory, in short, seems to address a question
about the connection between two concepts, law and morality. Whatever the upshot of that
conceptual inquiry, the question of which moral theory is true seems open to independent argu-
ment and determination.").
22. See sources cited supra note 20.
23. Thus, the question would still be whether the law would have to reflect the content of the
moral system, see supra note 18 and accompanying text, or instead might merely have to reflect
certain procedural requirements, see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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a variety of practices. 24 For example, it has been described both as
permitting and as prohibiting interracial marriages, 25 and both as per-
mitting and as prohibiting nonprocreative marital sex.26 One would
expect the same lack of consensus with respect to same-sex unions,
especially where some of the issues dividing Natural LawM Theorists
about the moral permissibility or impermissibility of interracial mar-
riages or nonprocreative sex will also divide theorists on this issue.
That there are debates among Natural LawM Theorists about what
is permitted and prohibited is itself significant, since the claimed obvi-
ousness and certainty of the moral dictates of the system are under-
mined if reasonable individuals can come to opposite conclusions
about the morality of particular practices. 27 Thus, if it is claimed that
Natural Law is a preferable alternative to other systems because it
offers certainty while other theories do not 28 and if Natural Law is
itself indeterminate, then the claims about its superiority in this re-
spect are at best unpersuasive.
The more compelling difficulty for the Natural LawM Theorist, how-
ever, is not merely that the claimed obviousness and certainty of the
system are in fact illusory, since such a criticism might be made about
a variety of systems.2 9 Rather, it is that some of the justifications for
24. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 351 (1969) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (suggesting that Natural Law "standards do not bind judges within any boundaries that can
be precisely marked or defined by words for holding laws unconstitutional"); see also LLOYD L.
WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 2 (1987). Weinreb states:
Natural law persisted, the more easily because there was nothing to limit its specific
content, and was used to identify whatever was deemed fundamental-that is, certain
and non-negotiable. Hobbes and Locke each referred to the premises of his system as
dictates of nature, although the principles so described could not have been less alike.
Id.; see also Kathryn Dean Kendell, Principles and Prejudice: Lesbian and Gay Civil Marriage
and the Realization of Equality, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 81, 92 (1996) ("Natural law can be asserted
for virtually any proposition, on any side of an issue.").
25. Compare Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 752 (Va. 1955), in which the Supreme Court of
Virginia cited with approval State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871), in which the Supreme Court of
Indiana had suggested that Natural Law forbids interracial marriage, with State v. Ross, 76 N.C.
242 (1877), in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina suggested that Natural Law did not
forbid such marriages.
26. See infra notes 78-107 and accompanying text (discussing different Natural Law positions
with respect to the conditions, if any, under which nonprocreative sexual relations are
permissible).
27. See supra note 24 (discussing Natural Law's lack of definitive content).
28. This is suggested by Charles Rice. See Charles E. Rice, Some Reasons for a Restoration of
Natural Law Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539, 556 (1989) (suggesting that Natural
Law provides the only basis for declaring "absolute, inalienable rights against the State").
29. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 45-49 (1980)
(discussing the claim that utility comparisons cannot be made); see also MARK STRASSER, THE
MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL: TOWARD MODIFICATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY
UTILITARIANISM 54-78 (1991) (discussing whether utilitarian calculations are possible).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the permissibility of interracial marriage and nonprocreative sex un-
dermine the purported justifications for the impermissibility of same-
sex marriage. Indeed, some commentators suggest that Natural Law
supports same-sex marriage. 30
C. Interracial Marriage
Natural Law has long been cited to explain why interracial mar-
riages are impermissible.3' Further, those claims were not only made
in the 1700s and 1800s-in the 1950s and 1960s, courts were making
clear their belief that God does not permit individuals of different
races to marry.32 Even more recently, courts have asserted the reli-
gious view that interracial marriage is contrary to God's will.33
The difficulties posed for the Natural LawM Theorist by the disa-
greement about whether interracial marriages are morally permissible
cannot be easily dismissed. Such theorists must explain how individu-
als could have believed (and, perhaps, still believe) that Natural Law
precludes such marriages. Of course, a theorist might suggest that
such individuals are correct. However, he must then explain how
those citing Natural Law to establish the permissibility of such mar-
riages could be wrong. In any event, he would risk the charge that
Natural Law as currently interpreted is a mask for bigotry and thus
should not be incorporated within the civil law.
A Natural LawM Theorist might suggest that some of the dictates of
Natural Law are unclear and are subject to disagreement among rea-
sonable people,34 or perhaps that Natural Law at one time prohibited
30. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 97 (1996) (discussing how the unitive goal of marriage
should induce Natural Law Theorists to support same-sex marriage).
31. See State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 404-05 (1871) (noting state must be allowed to prohibit
interracial marriage to effect God's wishes); Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858,
869 (1878) (asserting God and nature forbid interracial marriage); Rodney Patton, Student
Work, Queerly Unconstitutional?: South Carolina Bans Same-Sex Marriage, 48 S.C. L. REV. 685,
703-04 (1997) ("South Carolina, like many other states, once prohibited interracial marriages
because such unions were believed to violate natural law."); James Trosino, Note, American
Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93, 114 (1993)
(discussing individuals "claiming that interracial marriage was against the will of God").
32. See Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955). The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
made clear its belief that God prohibited interracial unions. See id. at 752.
In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967), the United States Supreme Court discussed a lower
court's opinion that God did not intend that the races marry.
33. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974). The University subscribed to
certain precepts, including that "God intended segregation of the races and that the Scriptures
forbid interracial marriage." Id. at 735.
34. See Peter R. MacLeod, Note, Latin Legal Writing: An Inquiry into the Use of Latin in the
Modern Legal World, 39 B.C. L. REV. 235, 241 (1997) ("Natural law is a complicated and unclear
doctrine.").
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interracial marriage but no longer does. 35 However, either of these
responses would undermine the constancy and determinacy of the sys-
tem's dictates 36 and would invite the response that same-sex marriage
might also be one of those subjects about which reasonable Natural
LawM Theorists might disagree or which once might have been imper-
missible but now is permissible.
The Natural LawM Theorist might instead suggest that an individual
believing interracial marriage impermissible probably had his or her
judgment corrupted in some way. As Francis Hutcheson explained,
"When the strain of conversation and popular maxims have long rep-
resented certain actions or events as good, and others as evil; we find
it difficult to break the association, even after our reason is convinced
of the contrary. '37 Yet, the same might be said of the reactions of
many to same-sex relationships, namely, that the associations incul-
cated since childhood are affecting the ability to make a correct, unbi-
ased moral judgment.
D. What Does Natural Law Forbid?
When two individuals disagree about what Natural LawM requires
or forbids, there must be some way to settle the disagreement. A the-
orist who suggests that Natural Law is a system of "rules and princi-
ples for the guidance of human conduct" which may be "discovered by
the rational intelligence of man" 38 will not help resolve the disagree-
ments at issue here, because each of the disagreeing parties would
claim to have used reason to discover the permissibility or impermissi-
bility of such marital unions. By the same token, an appeal to revela-
tion is of no help here,39 because either or both of the disagreeing
parties might claim to have had his or her understanding enhanced
through revelation. Unless some non-question-begging way to resolve
35. See Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1071, 1079-80 (1994) ("[R]ules validated by fundamental principle may change with time
and societal condition."); Schuyler M. Moore, A Practitioner's Primer on Natural Law, 4 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 455, 459 (1995) ("The most important element of natural law is its capacity to
evolve with time as the morals of a culture change.").
36. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RiOHrrs 44 (1980) (suggesting that right-
ness and wrongness depend upon the nature of things). Presumably, on this view, these moral
qualities would be unchanging.
37. FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY bk. 1, ch. 1, art. 8, p. 30 (A.M.
Kelley 1968) (1755).
38. Lynne Marie Kohm, The Homosexual "Union": Should Gay and Lesbian Partnerships be
Granted the Same Status as Marriage?, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 51, 55-56 (1996).
39. See Rice, supra note 28, at 560-62 (discussing the need for reason to be aided by
revelation).
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these disputes is offered, the credibility of the Natural Law claims to
clarity and certainty will be severely diminished.
There are additional ways to establish the superiority of one posi-
tion over another without appealing to reason or revelation. For ex-
ample, if it could be established that permitting a particular practice
would be disastrous, that would seem to be a compelling reason to
believe that practice impermissible. However, it should be noted that
the mere claim that a particular practice will be disastrous will not
make it so.
When courts discussed why interracial marriages were impermissi-
ble, they suggested that allowing interracial couples to marry would
result in dire consequences. 40 When Isaac Jones was convicted of hav-
ing married a woman of a different race, he was "convicted of a crime,
not only against the law of Virginia, but against the just sensibilities of
her civilization. '41 That conviction was overturned, not because it was
believed that there was anything wrong with punishing an individual
for marrying outside of his or her race, but because the state could not
prove that Isaac Jones and his wife were in fact of different races.42
A different Virginia court had already explained the importance of
preventing the races from intermarrying.43 "The purity of public
morals, the moral and physical development of both races, and the
highest advancement of our cherished southern civilization, ...all
require that ... [the races] should be kept distinct and separate, and
that connections and alliances so unnatural that God and nature seem
to forbid them, should be prohibited by positive law."'44 Not surpris-
ingly, the claimed disastrous consequences of permitting interracial
marriages have not materialized-the public morals have not become
impure and the advancement of civilization has not been arrested. 45
Professor John Finnis suggests that the state's endorsement of
same-sex relationships would involve "an active threat to the stability
40. See Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 287, 311 (1871) ("A sound philanthropy, looking to
the public peace and the happiness of both races, would regard any effort to intermerge the
individuality of the races as a calamity full of the saddest and gloomiest portent to the genera-
tions that are to come after us.").
41. Jones v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 213, 216 (1884).
42. Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 538, 544-45 (1885).
43. Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 869 (1878).
44. Id.
45. However, some continue to disapprove of interracial marriages. See, e.g., Julie C.
Lythcott-Haims, Note, Where Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial Classification in America and Its
Implications for Transracial Adoption, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 549 (1994) (discussing
Alabama high school principal who threatened to cancel a prom if students brought dates of a
different race).
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of existing and future marriages. '46 Finnis claims this is true because,
for example, doing so allegedly would make nonsense of the view that
adultery is per se immoral rather than immoral because it may involve
deception or the breaking of an agreement.47  Finnis suggests that
such marriages need not and should not be recognized because the
stability of family life is of "fundamental importance" 48 and because
the recognition of same-sex marriages would allegedly threaten that
stability. If in fact same-sex marriage is not a threat to the traditional
family, as has been suggested in the courts,49 then one must wonder
how a community could rightly judge that it had a compelling interest
in denying same-sex marriages, Finnis's view notwithstanding. 50
Perhaps it will be argued that a difficulty in Finnis's account is the
arguably instrumental claim that same-sex marriages will somehow
lead to the destruction of the traditional family. 51 Thus, suppose that
contention can be shown to be false or that various other practices
which are much more likely to lead to the destruction of the family are
ignored whereas same-sex marriage, which is much less likely to do so,
is prohibited. 52 In that event, the credibility of the argument against
recognizing such marriages would be substantially weakened if not to-
tally undermined. The argument against same-sex unions might seem
to be on surer footing were it not arguably based on an empirical
claim.53
Natural LawM Theorists who argue that the recognition of same-sex
marriages would have deplorable consequences would seem to have at
least two worries: (1) their arguments would seem subject to empiri-
cal disconfirmation, and (2) their arguments are strikingly analogous




49. See, e.g., Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *20 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
50. Cf. Finnis, supra note 46, at 1070 (arguing that same-sex marriage threatens the stability of
the institution of marriage).
51. See Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 101 (1996) (sug-
gesting that Finnis's "claim that a particular action by government will have the effect of under-
mining companionate marriage is, at root, empirical and instrumental" and thus will be subject
to disconfirmation). Finnis claims that marriages also have intrinsic worth. See John Finnis, Is
Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM,
AND MORALITY 1, 14 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
52. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 442
(S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that heterosexual males are far more responsible for the breakdown of
the family than gays), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 518 U.S.
1001 (1996), on remand to 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
53. For a discussion of an intrinsic worth critique of same-sex marriage, see infra notes 108-26
and accompanying text.
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to arguments previously offered against permitting interracial couples
to marry. Indeed, these theorists' reliance on implausible empirical
claims to justify policies which do not seem to have a rational basis
only supports the suspicion that the suggested policies are a product of
prejudicial attitudes. 54
In a related context, Justice Blackmun suggested both that existing
disabilities imposed on lesbians, gays, and bisexuals often do not in
fact promote their purported goals and that the impositions of those
disabilities have often been invidiously motivated. 55 For example, he
suggested that disagreements about which sexual acts are morally per-
missible will not induce people to abandon morality or to think better
of murder, cruelty, or dishonesty, 56 thus rejecting the asserted claim
that protecting sodomy within the right to privacy would promote
rampant immorality. He further suggested that efforts to punish sod-
omy are the product of bias rather than legitimate social policy and
that a "State can no more punish private behavior because of religious
intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial ani-
mus. '' 57 He thereby implied not only that legal prohibitions imposed
on lesbians, bisexuals, and gays are comparable to those that have
been imposed on the basis of race, but also that both types of prohibi-
tions often stem from illicit intentions and motivations.
Sometimes, it is not the historical moral teachings themselves but
the method of applying those precepts that suggests invidious treat-
ment. Thus, arguments based on historical religious and moral teach-
ings may be used selectively to burden gays, lesbians, and bisexuals,
but not others, even though the traditions themselves made no such
distinction. For example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky asked
whether a "society that no longer criminalizes adultery, fornication, or
deviate sexual intercourse between heterosexuals, has a rational basis
to single out homosexual acts for different treatment. '58 In striking
down the state's sodomy law on state constitutional grounds, the court
rejected the notion that there was a "a rational basis for declaring this
one type of sexual immorality so destructive of family values as to
merit criminal punishment," pointing out that "other acts of sexual
immorality ...were likewise forbidden by the same religious and
54. Cf. Finnis, supra note 51, at 12 (discussing how silence about why gays and lesbians should
be disadvantaged may raise the suspicion that such disabilities are "grounded in subrational
motivations"). Yet, the same inference might be drawn when obviously specious arguments are
offered.
55. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 212.
57. Id. at 211-12.
58. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 501 (Ky. 1993).
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traditional heritage of Western civilization but are now decrim-
inalized." 59
In Bowers v. Hardwick,60 the Georgia law at issue did not distin-
guish between same-sex and opposite-sex sodomy.61 The Bowers ma-
jority itself chose to ignore the statutory language and to characterize
the issue in terms of same-sex sodomy rather than sodomy in gen-
eral.62 The Court might have reached the same result by considering
the existing Georgia statute and holding that nonmarital sodomy was
not protected by the fundamental right to privacy, 63 although equal
protection issues might still have been implicated in such an analysis
given the state's refusal to allow same-sex couples to marry. 64 How-
ever, the Bowers Court took special pains to indicate that it was not
addressing opposite-sex sodomy,65 as if same-sex sodomy was so dif-
ferent that it required a special, wholly different analysis.66 When
courts offer selective applications of moral teachings and selective in-
terpretations of statutes, they do not inspire confidence in the imparti-
ality or sincerity of those offering the interpretations.
Historically, courts had attempted to justify antimiscegenation stat-
utes by suggesting that interracial marriages posed a threat to civiliza-
tion.67 Yet, civilization would seem to be much more at risk by
allowing prejudice and bigotry to reign than by allowing same-sex or
interracial couples to marry. When concurring in a judgment striking
down the state's antimiscegenation statute, a member of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court noted, "Prejudice and intolerance are the cancers
of civilization. '68 There is no reason to think that prejudice on the
59. Id.
60. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
61. Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. Id. (suggesting that "the majority has distorted the question this case presents").
63. See State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 68 (R.I. 1980) (finding that the right to privacy does not
include nonmarital sodomy).
64. In Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.
1993), a plurality of the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the state's same-sex marriage ban
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution, remanding the case to give the
state an opportunity to establish its compelling reasons for its facially discriminating on the basis
of sex. Id. at 68. In Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *20 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1996), the court held that the state had not met its burden.
65. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
66. Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the Court, the Georgia Legislature has not
proceeded on the assumption that homosexuals are so different from other citizens that their
lives may be controlled in a way that would not be tolerated if it limited the choices of those
other citizens.").
67. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
68. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 32 (Cal. 1948) (Carter, J., concurring).
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basis of orientation is any healthier for the body politic than is preju-
dice on the basis of race.
It would be false to suggest that commentators are not sensitive to
the possibility that they will be charged with bias when offering argu-
ments against same-sex marriage which, at the very least, sound strik-
ingly familiar to those previously offered against interracial
marriage.69 Indeed, commentators sometimes try to explain why laws
preventing same-sex marriage are disanalogous to laws which pre-
vented interracial marriage.70 For example, Professor Lynn Wardle
suggests that such laws are not analogous because the former protect
"the basic unit of society-the family," whereas the latter did not,71 as
if supporters of antimiscegenation laws would never have argued that
those laws aimed to support the family and civilization itself. He fur-
ther suggests that because it is permissible to criminalize sodomy,72 it
is also permissible to prevent same-sex marriage.73 Yet, this is exactly
the kind of piggybacking argument that was used to justify laws invidi-
ously discriminating on the basis of race.
In McLaughlin v. Florida,74 the state attempted to justify its law
penalizing interracial fornication more heavily than intraracial forni-
cation by suggesting that the fornication statute supported its antimis-
cegenation statute.75 The Supreme Court rejected this analysis, 76
perhaps realizing the difficulties that accepting such an analysis might
pose. For example, had Florida's argument been accepted, then as
long as there were at least two laws, each imposing a (related kind of)
disability against one particular group, each law might be thought a
reasonable exercise of the police power because it would be viewed as
helping the state to enforce the other law. 77 When either law was
69. See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage,
1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 21 (charging that "opposition to same-sex marriage is treated as proof of
narrow-mindedness, dangerous fundamentalism, or an unprofessional mixing of personal moral
or religious preferences and law").
70. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
71. Wardle, supra note 69, at 75.
72. But see supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Bowers opinion did
not involve an exercise in good faith).
73. See Wardle, supra note 69, at 79. But see Mark Strasser, Sodomy, Adultery, and Same-Sex
Marriage: On Legal Analysis and Fundamental Interests, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcoming
Spring 1999) (suggesting that even were sodomy laws constitutional, this would not preclude
recognition of the fundamental right to marry a same-sex partner).
74. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
75. Id. at 195.
76. Id.
77. See Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimiscegenation
Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 1019-21 (1991) (discussing the hypocrisy involved in set-
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challenged, the state would claim that it was not attempting to act
invidiously but instead to bolster its current framework of laws.
Merely because some theorists offer specious distinctions which are
strikingly similar to those offered to justify antimiscegenation laws
does not imply that no arguments can be offered to prohibit same-sex
marriages which were not analogously used to prohibit interracial
marriages. Indeed, one obvious possibility might seem to suggest it-
self, namely, that same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry
because they cannot produce a child through their union. Because
interracial couples can reproduce through their union whereas no
same-sex couples can, this might seem to be an argument against
same-sex marriages which would not have been analogously used
against interracial unions.
E. Nonprocreational Sex
Commentators may attempt to differentiate former laws prohibiting
interracial marriage and current laws prohibiting same-sex marriage
by suggesting that there is an important difference between the two
types of couples-many interracial couples can have children through
their union whereas no same-sex couples can.7 8 However, commenta-
tors pointing to this difference are ignoring the historical bases used to
justify the "unnaturalness" of interracial unions, since courts would
sometimes point to the children of such marriages to justify the prohi-
bition-either by claiming that children of interracial unions might
themselves be unable to reproduce 79 or by claiming that children of
interracial unions were "inferior." 80 Further, when one considers that
St. Augustine even approved of sterile marriages because communion
and companionship of the spouses was an additional goal of mar-
riage,81 one must wonder about the accuracy of the claim that Natural
Law requires that individuals be able to procreate through their union
if they are to be allowed to marry.
ting up a system of mutually reinforcing invidiously discriminatory laws and claiming such laws
reasonable because they reinforced one another).
78. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing Finnis's view).
79. See State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883) ("[I]f the issue of a black man and a white
woman, and a white man and a black woman, intermarry, they cannot possibly have any prog-
eny, and such a fact sufficiently justifies those laws which forbid the intermarriage of blacks and
whites.").
80. See Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869); see also Trosino, supra note 31, at 101-02
(asserting that "the popular belief that children of interrracial marriage were mentally and physi-
cally inferior to pure race children" was offered as a justification to prevent interracial marriage).
81. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 30, at 96-97.
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Although discussing with approval Plutarch's comment that inter-
course with a sterile spouse is a desirable mark of esteem and affec-
tion,82 Finnis claims that gay and lesbian relationships "cannot express
or do more than is expressed or done if two strangers engage in [sex-
ual] ... activity to give each other pleasure, or a prostitute gives plea-
sure to a client in return for money. ' 83 This goes well beyond a claim
about the possibility of procreation and instead relies on a theory of
expression which very few, if any, theorists would be willing to em-
brace. Indeed, one wonders whether Finnis himself would embrace it
in any context other than the one in which he has offered it.
For example, suppose that Jan has sexual relations with her long-
time female partner, Kim. By and in having sexual relations with her
partner, Jan means to express her love for her partner and is so under-
stood by Kim. Notwithstanding Kim's having understood the meaning
that Jan had intended to convey, Finnis would deny that any such ex-
pression had occurred. All that Jan allegedly could have expressed to
Kim would have been what two strangers could express to each other
during anonymous sex or what a prostitute could have expressed
while servicing a client.
Finnis argues that same-sex couples cannot marry because their sex-
ual relations cannot be marital in the appropriate sense. "Because
their activation of one or even each of their reproductive organs can-
not be an actualizing and experiencing of the marital good ... [their
coupling] can do no more than provide each partner with an individ-
ual gratification. '84 He suggests that sexual acts are not marital unless
they have "procreative significance, not necessarily of being intended
to generate or capable in the circumstances of generating but at least
of being, as human conduct, acts of the reproductive kind. '85 He thus
offers a theory which would explain why the naturally sterile couple
may marry.
One difficulty for this theory is in the specification of the relevant
"reproductive kind." Were the requirement merely that the spouses
make the act as reproductive as much as they "then and there
[could]," 86 there would be no bar to same-sex spouses marrying and
having intercourse, since they might indeed fulfill that requirement.
The theory offered by Finnis requires that there be a way to differenti-
ate between those kinds of sexual relations which have the possibility
82. See Finnis, supra note 51, at 16.
83. Id. at 15.
84. Finnis, supra note 46, at 1066.
85. Id. at 1067.
86. Id.
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of producing a child and those kinds of sexual relations which do not
have such a possibility.8 7
Finnis suggests that individuals may perform an act of the correct
kind, even if "some biological condition happens to prevent that unity
resulting in generation of a child."'8 8 Presumably, by including those
who happen to be unable to procreate, he means to exclude those who
were intentionally sterilized. Yet, it is at best unclear why a particular
act would be of the right type if performed by individuals involuntarily
sterile but not if by individuals voluntarily sterile. In each case, the
individuals involved would intend to have sexual relations, knowing
that they could not produce a child through their lovemaking.
For example, suppose that Bill had a permanent and irrevocable
vasectomy because he decided that he never wanted to father any chil-
dren. Suppose further that he then met and married Caroline. Their
sexual relations would not be unitive in the appropriate sense. Bill
does not merely happen to be unable to father a child but instead has
intentionally brought about that condition. It would hardly be persua-
sive to argue that contraceptive sex is not unitive for married
couples,89 but that noncontraceptive sex is, even for those couples
who use no contraception because one of the partners had voluntarily
been sterilized.
Suppose, however, that Bill now sincerely regrets his decision to
have had a vasectomy. He would undo the procedure if he could but
he has been reliably informed by his physician that this particular pro-
cedure cannot be undone. Perhaps the relations between Bill and
Carol would now be unitive in the appropriate sense because he sin-
cerely regrets his decision,90 even though he is now no more able to
father a child than he would have been had he never changed his mind
about the desirability of his having obtained a vasectomy. 91 Regard-
less of whether regretful Bill can engage in the appropriate unitive
relations, it would be quite difficult to offer a non-question-begging
way to distinguish between regretful Bill, nonregretful Bill, and some-
one naturally sterile with respect to whether he could engage in the
appropriate unitive relations, although Finnis must be able to do so if
his position is to be tenable.
87. See supra text accompanying note 85 (differentiating based upon whether the acts were of
the "reproductive kind").
88. Finnis, supra note 46, at 1068.
89. See Finnis, supra note 51, at 16.
90. I owe this suggestion to Mary Becker.
91. I owe this example to Mary Coombs.
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There are a variety of approaches that might be taken if the rele-
vant issue is how to morally evaluate individuals who are naturally
sterile versus individuals who intentionally and voluntarily bring
about their own sterility. Following John Stuart Mill, one could distin-
guish between acts and characters and argue that the characters of the
individuals who intentionally became sterilized would deserve a differ-
ent moral evaluation than would the characters of the individuals who
did nothing to bring about their sterility. 92 Yet, such an approach
would not be helpful in this context, because it might not be clear
what moral evaluation should be given to those individuals who inten-
tionally became sterilized. 93 Further, this evaluation would be even
more difficult to make in a case in which the individual now sincerely
regretted his former decision to become sterilized. Perhaps he is no
longer blameworthy (or praiseworthy) because of that sincere regret.
Or, perhaps he is less (or more) blameworthy (or praiseworthy) be-
cause he should have foreseen that he might change his mind but
nonetheless had a vasectomy anyway.
The important issue for Finnis's theory is not moral blameworthi-
ness or praiseworthiness per se but rather the proper way to individu-
ate actions.94 Finnis must show how the acts (or behaviors) of the
different marital couples can be distinguished so that some are of the
"right" kind but others are not, even though the couples' current sex-
ual behaviors are identical. The theory of act-individuation which is
required in Finnis's account is much more complicated than might first
be realized.
Indeed, it may be even more complicated than the above suggests.
Consider two lesbians in a long-term, committed relationship who
sometimes make artificial insemination an integral part of their love-
making. Or, consider two gay men who sometimes make it a part of
their lovemaking to produce sperm which is to be used in artificial
insemination. The lovemaking of either of these couples might have
to be included as being of the "right" kind, because it might in fact
result in the production of a child. If their lovemaking were not so
classified, assuming that a non-question-begging distinction could
somehow be offered, then there would be the surprising result that
sexual relations which cannot result in the production of children are
92. See MILL, supra note 15, at 18 ("[T]he motive has nothing to do with the morality of the
action, though much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning
does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his
trouble.").
93. Arguably, the person was praiseworthy for acting responsibly.
94. For a discussion of act-individuation, see MARK P. STRASSER, AGENCY, FREE WILL, AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 37-58 (1992).
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of the correct reproductive kind95 but that sexual relations which can
produce children are not.96
Finnis does not helpfully explain how this issue should be resolved.
He suggests that although biological union between men and women
does not result in generation in most circumstances, "it is the beha-
viour that unites biologically because it is the behaviour which, as be-
haviour, is suitable for generation. ' 97 Yet, the behavior of sterilized
individuals is not suitable for generation in that it will never result in
generation. Further, the same-sex lovemaking in which artificial in-
semination plays a role is suitable in that it might result in generation.
If suitability is not to be defined in terms of reproductive possibility
but instead in a different way, e.g., those behaviors with a stamp of
moral approval from a particular moral theory, then that should be
made explicit and Finnis should not pretend that this has to do with
the possibility of reproduction.
Finnis suggests that all "who accept that homosexual acts can be a
humanly appropriate use of sexual capacities must, if consistent, re-
gard sexual capacities, organs and acts as instruments for gratifying
the individual 'selves' who have them."98 As illustrated above, that
claim is false if such a conclusion is not required as long as the act can
be reproductive. Yet, even if it was true, one would have to wonder
what non-question-begging way is being offered to distinguish be-
tween a same-sex couple and a married couple, each incapable of
procreating through their union, each viewing themselves as solely in-
tending to gratify each other when having sexual relations, and each
viewed by others in the same way. Insofar as actions are grouped into
kinds by looking at the conative states of agents or by looking at the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of the behavior, it may be quite
difficult to distinguish between the actions of these two different
couples.99
Finnis claims that same-sex partners cannot have "a common good
that could be actualized and experienced by ... bodily union,"'10 0 pre-
95. See Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 262, 280
(1995) (suggesting that heterosexual relations which cannot produce children are not appropri-
ately included within the correct kind).
96. Some of the ideas expressed in this section are contained in MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY
WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 54-55 (1997).
97. Finnis, supra note 51, at 25-26 n.76 (emphasis added).
98. Finnis, supra note 46, at 1070.
99. For different analyses of the connection between the agent's conative states and his or her
actions, see generally DONALD DAVIDSON, Intending, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 83
(1980) and ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF HUMAN AcTION (1970).
100. Finnis, supra note 51, at 15.
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sumably because the common good involved in an expression of
same-sex love does not count as the "right" kind of good or the
"right" kind of love. He then argues that because this common good
cannot be experienced, a kind of disintegration of self occurs. 01 Yet,
even if this disintegration occurs, subjective experience notwithstand-
ing, he fails to consider that the individuals themselves may feel
united in a kind of oneness. Further, Finnis apparently believes that
this disintegration will not occur in marital relationships, even if one
of the parties feels alienated, perhaps because she is only having sex-
ual relations to placate her husband.102 Thus, the disintegration which
is part of Finnis's theory is radically disconnected from the actual ex-
periences of the selves who are allegedly undergoing this disintegra-
tion and alienation.
Finnis suggests that a married couple who engages in coitus inter-
ruptus would be engaging in an impermissible practice, 0 3 as presuma-
bly would the intentionally sterilized couple when they had sexual
relations. An accidentally sterile couple might engage in the "right"
kind of activity, even if they were solely seeking sexual gratification,
quite consciously and intentionally. Further, the same might be said
of a fertile couple who used no protection, did not want a child, and
were also solely interested in gratification. Bracketing whether seek-
ing sexual gratification should have the moral taint which Finnis seems
to want to ascribe to it,104 the above moral characterizations seem at
the very least noncompelling.
Finnis takes great pains to explain why the naturally sterile person
can engage in the appropriately unitive marital act. 105 Presumably,
this is because it is no fault of the individual that he or she is unable to
reproduce. Suppose that orientation is either genetic or fixed early in
childhood so that it, too, is not chosen. The same claims about lack of
"fault" might be made here, too.
Perhaps Finnis would point to the following difference between the
naturally sterile person and the naturally gay or lesbian person.
Although one's orientation would be toward individuals of the same
sex, one still could have children if one were to be married to some-
101. Id.
102. See Mary Becker, Problems with the Privatization of Heterosexuality, 73 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1169, 1180-81 (1996) (discussing reasons that women in marital relationships might have
unwanted sex).
103. Finnis, supra note 46, at 1068.
104. See Macedo, supra note 95, at 281-85 (1995) (questioning Natural Law's "[c]ramped
[v]iew" of valuable sexual relations).
105. See Finnis, supra note 51, at 15-16; Finnis, supra note 46, at 1067-69.
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one of the opposite sex.106 Thus, natural inclinations notwithstanding,
one might choose an opposite-sex partner. The individual might not
be able to love his or her marital partner but nonetheless should
choose him or her so that children might be produced or that unitive
acts might take place. Not only would this have extremely disintegrat-
ing and alienating effects, but this disintegration and alienation would
actually be experienced by the selves who had been put into this posi-
tion. Further, it is unlikely that these would be happy or healthy
homes for any of the parties involved, although theorists might argue
that one is morally required to give up health and happiness for the
possibility that one might be able to engage in appropriately unitive
acts.
Consider the individual who loves an opposite-sex, would-be mari-
tal partner who is sterile. Should this potentially procreating individ-
ual be pressured into choosing a different mate? While the sterile
individual might not have chosen his or her condition, the nonsterile
individual would be choosing to enter into a marriage which could not
result in children. Arguably, this person should, just as the lesbian or
gay person allegedly should, choose another mate if there is to be a
marriage. Further, it will not help that Finnis has offered a way for the
nonvoluntarily sterile person to be able to engage in "procreative-
like" acts, because the potentially procreating person discussed here
would have chosen to be with someone who could not procreate. 10 7
Just as the potentially procreating individual would not be wrong to
choose a sterile mate, a gay or lesbian would not be wrong to choose a
same-sex partner, Finnis's view notwithstanding.
F. Intrinsic Worth
A different tack might be adopted to justify differing assessments of
same-sex and opposite-sex relationships. Professors Robert George
and Gerard Bradley offer an intrinsic worth argument to support their
Natural Law critique of same-sex marriage.10 8 According to their the-
ory, individuals who engage in the appropriate kind of sexual behavior
can achieve a basic marital good, "whether or not they are capable of
106. This might require artificial insemination of the husband's sperm, although it is not at all
clear that this would be permissible insofar as Finnis's position reflects that of the Catholic
Church. See John A. Robertson, Liberalism and the Limits of Procreative Liberty: A Response
to My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 244 (1995) (suggesting that the Church is against
"artificial insemination with husband's sperm, and other reproductive techniques that enable
married couples to procreate").
107. See Finnis, supra note 46, at 1067-68.
108. Finnis shares a similar intrinsic worth argument. See Finnis, supra note 51, at 14 (discuss-
ing the intrinsic goodness of the marital union).
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conceiving children in their acts of genital union."10 9 Asserting that
an instrumentalist view "damages the basic good of human integ-
rity," 110 these theorists reject the tradition within Natural Law which
asserts that sexual acts are only instrumentally good insofar as they
can produce children."' These theorists also seem to reject, at least
implicitly, that individuals who intentionally become sterilized will be
engaging in an unacceptable practice when having sexual relations.112
George and Bradley understand that others may not appreciate the
intrinsic goodness of the marital practices of which they speak."13
However, that is not a worry, since "[i]ntrinsic value cannot, strictly
speaking, be demonstrated. ' 114 They further warn that "whatever un-
dermines the sound understanding and practice of marriage in a cul-
ture-including ideologies that are hostile to that understanding and
practice-makes it difficult for people to grasp the intrinsic value of
marriage and marital intercourse.' 1 5 They thus imply that those who
are knowledgeable and, perhaps, whose understanding has not been
corrupted will have the proper appreciation of the intrinsic value of
marriage and of marital intercourse.
George and Bradley do not seem to appreciate the irony of sug-
gesting that cultural practices and ideologies may make it difficult to
grasp the intrinsic worth of marriage and family but that they none-
theless can appreciate the worth of same-sex relationships and same-
sex intercourse. Apparently, they believe that the "knowledge" of the
worths of these practices should not be corrupted by an actual exper-
iencing of them and that those who have such experience do not have
anything relevant to say.
The point here should not be misunderstood. These theorists are
correct to point out that there are difficulties in establishing or appre-
ciating intrinsic worth and value, especially by those who have little
acquaintance with the matter at issue due to personal or cultural cir-
cumstances." 6 Yet, they seem unable to appreciate the implications
of such a point, since they themselves may have difficulty in grasping
109. Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO.
L.J. 301, 301-02 (1995).
110. Id. at 305.
111. Id. at 304.
112. See id. ("[T]he instrinsic point of sex in any marriage, fertile or not, is, in our view, the
basic good of marriage itself, considered as a two-in-one-flesh communion of persons that is
consummated and actualized by acts of the reproductive type.").
113. Id. at 306-07.
114. Id. at 307.
115. George & Bradley, supra note 109, at 307.
116. Id.
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the intrinsic value of same-sex relationships, given the ideologies that
are hostile to such an understanding.
John Stuart Mill argued that some pleasures were intrinsically supe-
rior to others.117 However, because others, e.g., Jeremy Bentham,
claimed that no pleasures were intrinsically superior to any other, 118
Mill sought to provide a neutral method to determine which pleasures
were intrinsically superior. 119 He asked that it be supposed that one
of two pleasures
is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far
above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be
attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign
it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capa-
ble of.120
In that case, he suggested that we would be "justified in ascribing to
the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing
quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account." 121
Mill's approach is helpful to consider in this context. At issue here
are claims both about which relationships are superior and about the
implications of that superiority. Yet, when one is challenged by a
claim that one practice is intrinsically superior to another, it is at best
unconvincing to simply reassert that position. Presumably, the other
individual will simply reassert the denial of the alleged intrinsic supe-
riority of the practice at issue and no progress will have been
achieved. Thus, when George and Bradley claim that the marital rela-
tionship is intrinsically superior, 122 they seem to have no helpful re-
sponse to someone who challenges that claim.
Perhaps, following Mill, one should see whether those who have
familiarity with both same-sex and opposite-sex relationships or prac-
tices would universally choose one type over the other. Indeed, one
wonders what George and Bradley would say if "knowledgeable"
judges chose same-sex over opposite-sex relationships and practices,
despite some of the societally imposed, extrinsic costs of doing So. 12 3
Would these theorists suggest that opposite-sex marriages should not
be permitted?
117. MILL, supra note 15, at 8-9.
118. THE RATIONALE OF REWARD (1825), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
253 (John Bowring ed., 1962). Bentham writes, "Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of
equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more
pleasure, it is more valuable than either." Id.
119. MILL, supra note 15, at 8.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 8-9.
122. George & Bradley, supra note 109, at 305.
123. Some of the points here are discussed in STRASSER, supra note 96, at 55-57.
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There is no need to actually have such a test, because the point here
is not to make an assertion about which practices are intrinsically su-
perior or which practices have intrinsic worth, but to suggest that the
intrinsic worth argument is much less compelling than might first ap-
pear and as readily supports as undermines recognizing same-sex mar-
riages.' 24 Further, the theorist's argument itself is of the sort that
would never be offered in any other marital context. Basically, these
theorists are suggesting that because one marriage is intrinsically bet-
ter than another, the less preferable marriage simply should not be
legally recognized. Yet, they would never assert such a claim were
same-sex marriages shown to be intrinsically superior. By the same
token, were marriages of fertile couples intrinsically superior to mar-
riages of nonfertile couples, these theorists would presumably never
claim that the latter couples should be prohibited from marrying.
Natural Law Theorists who claim that the law cannot recognize
same-sex marriages at best illustrate the difficulties in determining
what their theory requires, permits, and prohibits. 125 The justifica-
tions involving extrinsic and intrinsic worth seem better suited to es-
tablishing that such marriages must be recognized than that they
should not be. Such a result is especially ironic, given that other Natu-
ral LawM theories more straightforwardly support the permissibility of
same-sex marriage.126 If the theories of Finnis, George, and Bradley
are the best examples of Natural Law theories which (allegedly) pro-
hibit same-sex marriage, then perhaps Natural LawM Theorists should
admit that their theories support the moral permissibility of same-sex
marriage.
II. ExiSTING DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW
Even were it possible to establish that Natural LawM had a determi-
nate position on the permissibility of same-sex unions, a different is-
sue is whether the law should take account of that position and, if so,
how. Numerous state and individual interests are implicated in mar-
riage and those must be considered either instead of or in addition to
the Natural LawM position before one can establish that the state
should or should not permit same-sex couples to marry.
124. See generally Becker, supra note 102 (arguing that same-sex relationships are morally
preferable to opposite-sex relationships).
125. See Philip Soper, Making Sense of Modern Jurisprudence: The Paradox of Positivism and
the Challenge for Natural Law, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 67, 72 (1988) (suggesting that it is not
surprising that there is no consensus about what Natural Law dictates).
126. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also VINCENT J. SAMAR, JUSTIFYING JUDG-
MENT: PRACTICING LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 188 (1998) (suggesting that Natural Law theory is
compatible with same-sex marriage).
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A. The Promotion of Morality
The state has a legitimate interest in promoting morality.127 Yet, as
suggested above, the correct moral evaluation of same-sex relation-
ships is at the very least a contested issue. A variety of moral theories
suggest that such relationships are morally permissible if not praise-
worthy.128 Thus, even were Natural LawM clear that same-sex mar-
riages were impermissible, that would not establish that such unions
were immoral, since there are a variety of moral systems of which Nat-
ural LawM is but one example. 129 The state has a legitimate interest in
the promotion of morality generally rather than Natural LawM in par-
ticular or, more to the point, a particular version of Natural LawM.'
30
Thus, even were the Natural LawM positions outlined above allegedly
establishing the impermissibility of same-sex marriage more persua-
sive, 131 this would not establish that the state's interest in morality
would be promoted by incorporating that position into the law.
When individuals discuss what is moral or immoral, they might not
have in mind what a particular theory says but instead the majority
view of a particular society. Yet, merely because the majority of a
particular society happens to believe that a particular practice is im-
moral does not make it so. For example, those believing interracial
marriages immoral are simply wrong, even if in fact they are the ma-
jority in a particular community.
Even were there unanimity about which practices were morally per-
missible or impermissible, it would not follow that the law should re-
flect those views. As Justice Stevens suggested in a related context,
"the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice.' 132 Presumably, at least one
127. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (asserting that the promotion of morality is
part of the traditional police power of the state).
128. See Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwit-
tingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 937, 966-67 (1991) ("[A]ccording to a variety of theories,
homosexual behavior is morally permissible.").
129. See Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith and the Baehr Essentials: On Giving Credit Where
It's Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 313, 351 (1997) ("[M]erely because Natural Law is a system of moral-
ity does not imply that it is the only system of morality.").
130. See supra note 127.
131. See supra notes 20-126 and accompanying text.
132. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens J., dissenting); see also Gryczan v.
State, 942 P.2d 112, 125 (Mont. 1997). The Montana Supreme Court asserted:
[I]t does not follow, however, that simply because the legislature has enacted as law
what may be a moral choice of the majority, the courts are, thereafter, bound to simply
acquiesce. Our Constitution... guarantee[s] to all persons, whether in the majority or
in a minority, those certain basic freedoms and rights which are set forth in the Decla-
ration of Rights, not the least of which is the right of individual privacy. Regardless
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of the points which Justice Stevens had in mind was that there are a
variety of individual and state interests which must be considered
before a law is enacted or declared constitutional, regardless of the
prevailing view about the moral permissibility of the practice at issue.
B. Implicated Interests in Marriage
While the state has an interest in promoting morality, it also has a
number of other interests which must be considered when marriage
laws are at issue. State interests in the recognition and promotion of
marriage include the promotion of stability, the limitation of the disor-
ganized breakdown of relations, and the provision of a home for the
production and rearing of children. 133 All of these interests would be
promoted by recognizing same-sex marriages. It should be noted, for
example, that same-sex couples are having and raising children, even
if those children are not produced through their union. 134 Indeed,
some states recognize both members of same-sex couples as the legal
parents of the same child, precisely because this will promote the best
interests of that child. 135 Thus, some commentators' claims notwith-
standing, the state's interest in assuring that children will have a
healthy, supportive environment in which to thrive militates in favor
of the recognition of same-sex marriage rather than against it.136 In-
deed, the court in Baehr v. Miike recognized the good parenting skills
of individuals in same-sex relationships. 137
Just as the state's interests would be promoted by recognizing same-
sex marriages, various individual interests would also be promoted by
affording that recognition. The Supreme Court has articulated some
of the individual interests which are implicated in marriage. Mar-
riages are "expressions of emotional support and public commit-
that majoritarian morality may be expressed in the public policy pronouncements of the
legislature, it remains the obligation of the courts-and of this Court in particular-to
scrupulously support, protect and defend those rights and liberties guaranteed to all
persons under our Constitution.
Id.
133. See Strasser, supra note 129, at 361-63 (discussing states' interests in marriage).
134. ESKRIDGE, supra note 30, at 110.
135. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318-21 (Mass. 1993); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d
397, 398-99 (N.Y. 1995); Adoptions of B.L.V.P. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1273-76 (Vt. 1993).
136. For further discussion of the societal interests implicated in recognizing same-sex mar-
riages, see generally Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumbering
Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 921, 976-80 (1995).
137. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996) ("Gay and lesbian parents and same-sex couples can provide children with a nurturing
relationship and a nurturing environment which is conducive to the development of happy,
healthy and well-adjusted children.").
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ment. '' 138 They have spiritual significance and are the precondition to
a variety of government benefits. 139 These interests are implicated
whether one is discussing same-sex or opposite-sex couples. Indeed,
although the Supreme Court of Hawaii denied that there is a funda-
mental right to same-sex marriage, 140 the fundamental right to marry
arguably should include the right to marry a same-sex partner. 141
It might be suggested that individual interests militate against recog-
nizing same-sex marriages in that allowing same-sex couples to marry
would devalue the worth of marriage in the eyes of some opposite-sex
couples, and that this is the reason that same-sex marriages should not
be recognized. Yet, the speciousness of such an argument becomes
apparent as soon as one considers other contexts in which such a claim
might be made. Certainly, such an argument would not be given
much weight were it offered to justify the refusal to recognize interra-
cial or interreligious marriages. Yet, individuals might sincerely be-
lieve that the value of their marriages had been diminished by the
state's recognizing interracial or interreligious unions.
C. The Coherence Model
Some commentators seem to be offering a much different reason to
believe that same-sex marriages should not be recognized by the state,
namely, that recognizing such unions would allegedly not cohere with
other state practices regarding marriage.142 This view might seem
akin to a Law-as-Integrity theory.143 However, close analysis yields
the conclusion that the coherence model of law would support rather
than undermine state recognition of same-sex marriages.
Finnis points out that sodomitical acts have not been recognized in
law as consummating a marriage.1 44 He seems to be suggesting that it
would be inappropriate for the state to recognize same-sex marriages,
because sodomitical relations are not viewed as consummating the
marriage and same-sex couples would presumably be engaging in
sodomitical relations.145 Such an argument is unpersuasive. Were
138. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987).
139. Id. at 96.
140. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55 (Haw.), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993).
141. See generally Strasser, supra note 136, at 951-76 (discussing the importance of the right to
marry and why marrying a same-sex partner should be included within this right).
142. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
143. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) (discussing Law-as-Integrity
theory).
144. Finnis, supra note 46, at 1068.
145. See id.
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same-sex unions legally recognized, it seems likely that the law would
be changed so that sodomitical relations might in fact be viewed as
consummating the marriage. Even if such a change would not occur,
Finnis's observation still does not have the import that he suggests.
For example, individuals who have married and who have only had
sodomitical relations or who have never had sexual relations of any
sort will remain married until the marriage is challenged and is held
void by a court.146 Thus, the ability or desire to have intercourse is
neither necessary for getting married nor for having the marriage rec-
ognized by the state. Not all states have recognized impotence, much
less sterility, as a ground for annulling a marriage, 147 although the ad-
vent of no-fault divorce may have made such an issue less important.
A further point which undermines Finnis's analysis is that, as various
courts have recognized, marital sodomy is protected by the right to
privacy.1 48 Thus, Finnis's analysis notwithstanding, the law recognizes
that sodomitical relations fall within the right to privacy for married
individuals and thus there would be no lack of coherence in the law
were the state to legally recognize same-sex unions.
The fact that many states permit marriages to be annulled for non-
consummation 149 does not suggest that the ability or desire to have
146. See Woods v. Woods, 638 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that lack of
consummation made marriage voidable rather than void).
147. See Linneman v. Linneman, 116 N.E.2d 182, 185-86 (I11. App. Ct. 1953) (refusing to rec-
ognize impotence as ground for annulment).
148. See Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1976) ("We may thus assume that the
marital intimacies shared by the Lovisis when alone and in their own bedroom are within their
protected right of privacy."); Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1968) ("Indiana courts
could not interpret the [Indiana sodomy] statute constitutionally as making private consensual
physical relations between married persons a crime absent a clear showing that the state had an
interest in preventing such relations, which outweighed the constitutional right to marital pri-
vacy."); State v. Lair, 301 A.2d 748, 753 (N.J. 1973) (finding that sodomy statute has marital
exception); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 66-68 (R.I. 1980) (implying that right of privacy would
protect marital sodomy); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 218 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[O]ur prior cases thus establish that a State may not prohibit sodomy within the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms.") (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965)).
149. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.030(5) (Michie 1996) (marriage voidable for failure to con-
summate the marriage at the time of the marriage and continuing at the time of the commence-
ment of the action); CAL. FAM CODE § 2210(f) (West 1994) (marriage voidable if either party
impotent at time of marriage and that incapacity continues and appears to be incurable); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 1506(2) (1993) (marriage voidable if, unbeknownst to party at the time of
the marriage, the other party lacked physical capacity to consummate marriage); IDAHO CODE
§ 32-501(6) (1996) (marriage voidable if either party at time of marriage was physically incapable
of entering into married state and incapacity continues and appears to be incurable); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.29(2) (West 1996) (marriage voidable if either party impotent at time of mar-
riage); MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 552.39 (West 1988) (action to annul for physical incapacity
must be commenced within two years of solemnization of marriage); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.02(b) (West 1990) (marriage voidable if, unbeknownst to party at time of the marriage,
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sexual relations, much less a particular kind of sexual relations, is nec-
essary for marriage, but merely that the state recognizes that sexual
intimacy is an important element of marriage for many individuals.
Individuals may reasonably expect that their marital partners will be
willing to have sexual relations, although of course the courts will not
be setting a standard with respect to how frequently such relations
must take place, e.g., daily, weekly, monthly, annually, etc.
Suppose that two individuals marry and unbeknown to one of the
parties the other party is either unable or unwilling to have sexual
relations. This might be viewed as a matter of fraud because, absent
reason to think otherwise, 150 each of the parties might reasonably as-
sume that the other would be willing to have sexual relations. 151 Yet,
even in a case where there has been fraud, the marriage would have
been made voidable rather than void.152 If each member of the
couple was satisfied with the marriage, lack of sexual relations
notwithstanding, then the marriage would continue to be recognized
by the state.153 Ironically, Finnis's discussion of how the state treats
marriage and sodomitical relations supports the state's recognizing
other party lacked physical capacity to consummate marriage); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-1(c)
(West 1997) (same); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7(3) (McKinney 1988) (marriage voidable if either
party incapable of entering into married state from physical cause); N.D. CErNr. CODE § 14-04-
01(6) (1997) (either party at time of marriage physically incapable of entering into married state,
and incapacity continues and is incurable); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.31(F) (Anderson
1996) (marriage may be annulled if never consummated); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 515 (1989)
(action to annul for physical incapacity must be commenced within two years of solemnization);
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-2(a)(3)(C) (1996) (at time of marriage, one of parties because of natural or
incurable impotency incapable of entering into marriage state); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.03(2)
(West 1993) (unbeknownst to other party at time of marriage, one party lacked capacity to con-
summate); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-101(f) (Michie 1997) (action to annul for physical incapacity
must be commenced within two years of solemnization).
150. See Jarzem v. Bierhaus, 415 So. 2d 88, 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("[I]f the wife's claim
for annulment or divorce had been based upon the fact that the husband was impotent, it would
have been unavailing if she had knowledge of such a fact before the marriage.").
151. See Marriage of Liu v. Liu, 242 Cal. Rptr. 649, 656 (Ct. App. 1987) ("An annulment may
be had for fraud where a wife harbors a secret intention at the time of the marriage not to
engage in sexual relations with her husband.") (citing Handley v. Handley, 3 Cal. Rptr. 910, 912
(Ct. App. 1960)).
152. See Tyson v. State, 90 So. 622, 623 (Fla. 1922). The Florida Supreme Court stated:
The general rule, supported by the great weight of authority and which we regard as
sound in principle, is to the effect that a marriage procured by fraud or while one of the
parties thereto is actually under legal duress is voidable only, and therefore valid and
binding upon the parties until annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Id. (citing Hawkins v. Hawkins, 38 So. 640, 641 (Ala. 1905)).
153. In Jarzem, the marriage was dissolved, not because the husband and wife were not having
sexual relations, but because he was having relations with someone else outside of the marriage.
415 So. 2d at 90. Had he been having sexual relations with no one, the marriage would not have
been voidable. See id.
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same-sex marriages, since the state recognizes "nonconsummated"
marriages as long as the parties themselves do not object.
D. The Production and Raising of Children
Even if the law's treatment of sodomy and the conditions under
which marriages will be viewed as valid would pose no difficulty for
the state's recognizing same-sex marriages, it might seem that an obvi-
ous and important point has been omitted in the above analysis,
namely that same-sex couples (allegedly) cannot fulfill the purpose of
marriage. Consider the argument against same-sex marriage which
has often been articulated and which seems to represent an instru-
mentalist Natural Law view of marriage, namely, that marriage is for
the production of children and that same-sex couples should be pre-
cluded from marrying because they are unable to have children
through their union.
One response is that same-sex couples do have children. 154 How-
ever, suppose that were not so. Even if one brackets that same-sex
couples are raising children, there is an additional difficulty posed by
the purpose-of-marriage argument. The theorists and courts offering
this argument either ignore or downplay the importance of the state's
not requiring either an ability or a willingness to have children when
opposite-sex couples wish to marry.
One court addressing the "problem" posed by infertile, opposite-
sex couples who nonetheless wished to marry suggested that the rea-
son that it was permissible for them but not for same-sex couples to
marry was that privacy issues would be implicated in the attempt to
find out whether the opposite-sex couple could produce a child
through their union, whereas no such issues would be involved when a
same-sex couple was being considered. 155 Yet, two opposite-sex indi-
viduals who publicly volunteered that they were unable to procreate
could not be precluded on that account from marrying, notwithstand-
ing their having obviated the privacy issue alluded to by the court.
Further, and what is especially interesting for purposes here, the cur-
rent policies of some states with respect to the marriages of first cous-
ins establishes that these states have rejected that this instrumentalist
Natural Law view underlies their domestic relations jurisprudence.
Some states prohibit individuals from marrying their first cousins
and will not recognize such marriages even if validly celebrated in an-
154. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
155. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124-25 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
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other jurisdiction. 156 Other states, like Ohio, will not allow such mar-
riages to be performed in the state but will recognize them if validly
celebrated elsewhere. 157 For purposes here, the most interesting laws
are found in a different group of states. These states have said that
first cousins can marry only if they are over a certain age, e.g., sixty-
five, or are able to establish that at least one of them cannot
reproduce.158
These states are allowing these marriages only if the couple cannot
reproduce through their union. Further, they do not require that the
individuals be accidentally or naturally sterile-their concern is that
the couple not be able to produce a child through their union. The
privacy claim which allegedly obviates the need to find out whether
opposite-sex couples can reproduce is simply not an issue here. In-
deed, these couples must affirmatively establish that they cannot pro-
duce a child through their union if they wish to marry. Thus, the claim
that marriage is predicated on the ability and willingness of couples to
procreate is not simply false, but is directly contrary to existing state
law.
III. CONCLUSION
The claim that Natural LawM prohibits same-sex marriage is decep-
tive, if not false. The most that can be claimed is that some Natural
Law moral theories condemn same-sex relations, although even those
theories may include justifications which as readily support as under-
mine the moral permissibility of same-sex marriages.
The state clearly has an interest in providing a stable setting for the
production and raising of children and the institution of marriage may
help to promote that interest. Yet, marriages have other purposes as
well, and even were that the only purpose, recognizing same-sex mar-
riages would promote rather than undermine that legitimate, signifi-
cant state interest, because gay and lesbian couples do have and raise
children.
Both the intrinsic and extrinsic Natural LawM arguments against the
state recognition of same-sex marriage are unconvincing. Further, the
156. See Estate of Mortenson v. Mortenson, 316 P.2d 1106, 1107 (Ariz. 1957).
157. See Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206, 208-09 (Ohio 1958).
158. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(B) (West Supp. 1997) (at least 65 or one is unable
to reproduce); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212(4) (West 1996) (at least 50 or either party per-
manently and irreversibly sterile); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-2 (Michie 1997) (at least 65);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-1 (Supp. 1997) (at least 65 or both at least 55 and one cannot
reproduce); Wis. STAT. ANN. (West 1993) § 765.03 (female 55 or either submits affidavit that
party is permanently sterile).
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state has a variety of interests, not even addressed in those critiques,
which would all be served by recognizing same-sex marriages. Finally,
since many of the individual interests promoted in opposite-sex mar-
riages are also promoted in same-sex marriages, there seems to be an
overwhelming number of reasons for the state to recognize those
unions.
There is no small irony in the claim that Natural Law requires that
same-sex marriages not be recognized, especially if one considers this
a claim about what Natural LawL requires. When Professor Lon
Fuller offered reasons to think that it would be advantageous to re-
quire that law be connected to morality in an essential way, he sug-
gested that such a requirement would be especially beneficial for
minorities. 159 He offered a thought experiment to establish his point.
Fuller imagined that he had been "transported to a country where
[his] beliefs were anathemas. ' 160 He suggested that there might be
''reason to fear that the law might be covertly manipulated to [his]
disadvantage," although he doubted that he "would be apprehensive
that its injunctions would be set aside by an appeal to a morality
higher than law. 1 61 He was thus suggesting that moral claims would
not be used to bolster unfair treatment of minorities.
Indeed, Fuller was willing to take his argument a step further, since
he was confident that if he as a member of a minority group "felt that
the law itself was [his] safest refuge.... it... [would] be because even
in the most perverted regimes there is a certain hesitancy about writ-
ing cruelties, intolerances, and inhumanities into law. 1 62 He believed
that such a hesitancy would itself derive, "not from a separation of law
and morals, but precisely from an identification of law with those de-
mands of morality that are the most urgent and the most obviously
justifiable.1 63 He was thus suggesting that the allegedly necessary
connection between law and morality would provide a bulwark
against biased treatment of minorities.
Yet, some of the obvious demands of morality, e.g., that individuals
should be treated equally and should have their fundamental interests
respected absent countervailing, noninvidious, compelling state inter-
ests, are ignored in discussions of whether same-sex couples should be
allowed to marry. Certainly, moral arguments are sometimes used to
secure the law's treating minorities in a fairer way and further it is not
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hard to imagine other commentators using specious nonmoral reasons
to establish, for example, that same-sex couples should be denied the
right to marry. Thus, it is not suggested here that positing a necessary
connection between law and morality will result in minorities' receiv-
ing worse treatment. Rather, it is suggested that the Natural LawL
position provides no guarantee that minorities will be treated any bet-
ter than they would be treated in a legal positivist system.
The Natural Law arguments offered to establish that same-sex mar-
riages should not be legally recognized help illustrate why casuistic
reasoning has come to have such a pejorative connotation. Not only
do the arguments as readily establish that such unions should be le-
gally recognized as that they should not be, but the commentators of-
fering the various claims seem oblivious to the implications of the very
arguments that have been offered. Further, these theorists ignore the
numerous moral and legal reasons for states to recognize same-sex
unions. The reality that many if not most states will not recognize
such unions, absent court order, has more to do with a current accept-
ance of second-class citizenship for a whole class of individuals 164 than
with the kinds of reasons traditionally offered to refuse to recognize
such marriages.
164. See Joseph Raz, Liberty and Trust, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY 113,
126 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) (discussing various manifestations of bigotry which "condemn
gay men and lesbians to second class status in their own society").
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